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For three days, between July 27th and 29th 2005, nearly 300 tribal, federal 
and state court judges, court commissioners, court administrators, peacemak-
ers, mediators, traditional forum practitioners, attorneys, lay advocates and other 
justice system professionals, met at a national conference entitled Walking On 
Common Ground: Pathways to Equal Justice, sponsored by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance. The 133 tribal, state, and federal 
judges constituted the overwhelming plurality at the conference, which discussed 
issues such as judicial leadership, choice of forum, judicial review, recognition 
of each other's judgments and orders, judicial independence, and the Indian 
Child Welfare Act. All levels of judiciaries, save the United States Supreme 
Court, were represented. 
The centerpiece of the conference, which was held at the Radisson Hotel 
and Conference Center operated by the Oneida Nation near Green Bay, Wis-
consin, was the ceremonial signing of a protocol by state and tribal judges from 
the 9th Wisconsin Judicial District. The second such protocol signed in Wis-
consin in the previous four years, it established procedures for the determining 
jurisdiction in causes of action in states where tribes and states have concurrent 
jurisdiction.1 The former chief judge of the Lac du Flambeau Ojibwe reserva-
tion and current Wisconsin tribal appeals court judge, the Honorable Ernest St. 
Germaine, conducted the ceremony, smudging the signatories and the docu-
0026-3079/2005/4603/4-233S2.50/0 American Studies, 46:3/4 (Fall-Winter 2005): 233-250 
Indigenous Studies Today, 1 (Fall 2005/Spring 2006) 
234 Larry Nesper 
ments, and offering each a ceremonial pipe he had loaded with tobacco. The 
conference marked, advanced, and celebrated the commitment of a growing 
national community of tribal, state, and federal judges to on-going institutional 
relationships among sovereigns.2 The segment of that community within the 
state of Wisconsin is the spearhead of this movement. Indeed, increasing use of 
the term "trifederalism"3 in Wisconsin is a measure of the emerging state-like 
status of tribes within its borders.4 
One of the reasons a conference of this magnitude is important is because it 
encourages and facilitates the development of tribal courts, of which at least 
260 exist today in Indian communities throughout the country (Joh 2000,119). 
Courts are important institutions of self-determination because they are the 
mundane mechanisms and manifestations of sovereignty wherein the nation 
appears as state in everyday life. Courts are productively thought of as theatri-
cal sites (Ball 1975; Merry 1994) where the official model of the society is 
authoritatively expressed and displayed. It is where the society putatively exer-
cises its will in and on the lives of its individual member-citizens. It is also 
where internal policies and external relations are publicly debated and where 
different orders of value and law confront each other (Merry 1990; Philips 1998). 
Most critically, as Mark Galanter has argued, courts are also important be-
cause they provide "a background of norms and procedures, against which ne-
gotiations and procedures in both private and governmental settings takes place," 
and they explicitly and implicitly authorize and immunize actors in regulatory 
settings (1983, 121-122). Furthermore, courts affect not only the individuals 
who are brought before them, but they also have the general effect of communi-
cating "information by or about the forum's action and of the response to that 
information" (1983,124). For tribes this means that tribal agencies and depart-
ments that make up these emergent tribal states—the institutions that realize 
and implement tribal sovereignty—gain powers of governance over tribal mem-
bers on the reservations; the very presence of courts reconfigures the landscape 
of strategic options, resources, and goals. Tribal appropriation of these institu-
tions, then, should cause us to re-imagine reservation communities as emergent 
states. 
Though many reservation agents had established Courts of Indian Offenses 
in the late-nineteenth century as a technology of governance (Hagan 1966), it 
was not until the passage of the Indian Organization Act in 1934 that permitted 
tribes to draft constitutions and re-establish self-governing institutions that the 
modern tribal courts appeared. Like tribal sovereignty, the powers of tribal courts 
today, however, are simultaneously extensive and limited. In 1959, in Williams 
v. Lee, the Supreme Court asserted that contracts made in Indian country are to 
be heard in tribal courts in order to protect tribal sovereignty (Wilkinson 1987). 
Consistent with this, in the 1980s, the Court in National Farmers Union Insur-
ance Cos. v. the Crow Tribe of Indians (1984) and Iowa Mutual Insurance v. 
LaPlante (1987,) has also ruled that civil disputes arising on the reservations 
will be first heard in tribal court (Pommersheim 1995). 
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court has ruled that tribal courts have no 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,5 and three separate acts of Congress have 
limited Indian criminal jurisdiction.6 Though ambiguously designated as "do-
mestic dependent nations" in the early nineteenth century, with extensive pow-
ers of self-governance,7 the Court also defers to the will of Congress, which 
began to assert plenary power over the tribes in the late eighteenth century even 
as the Executive treated with tribes as foreign nations. Acting on this ratifica-
tion of its own authority in this domain, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights 
Act in 1968, which unilaterally capped tribal court sentences at $5,000 and/or a 
year in jail and extended most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to tribal 
members. 
There are also internal constraints on the power of the courts. Tribal court 
judges are most often appointed rather than elected so they do not have the 
judicial independence that many of them would like to have, especially when 
tribal council members or members of their families appear in court. Further-
more, they do not often have the power of judicial review of actions of the tribal 
legislatures. Though there is considerable variability even in the area of the 
Great Lakes, most of these courts have not built their own case-law traditions 
nor do they commonly cite cases from other tribal courts.8 
It is with these caveats that I proceed to analyze how reservation societies 
are changing by virtue of the addition of courts to reservation governments. 
First, I offer an overview of tribal Wisconsin's political and legal landscape. I 
will then focus on the experience of the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Supe-
rior Chippewa Indians as it struggles with the contradictions of simultaneously 
coming to be imagined by its member-citizens both as a state-like sovereign 
structure committed to the rule of law, and as a community organized by kinship 
and custom, a "family of families," in the words of a former tribal councilman.9 
Wisconsin Indian Nations 
Indian country in Wisconsin is a complicated matter because there are more 
tribes—now more often referred to as "Indian nations"—within its borders than 
any other state east of the Mississippi. Furthermore, these reservation-based 
indigenous nations have different histories. Both the Menominee, the indig-
enous Algonquian-speaking people, and the Ho-Chunk (formerly the 
Winnebago), the indigenous Siouan-speakers, were present in the early seven-
teenth century when the first Europeans arrived, and it is clear from the ar-
chaeological record that they had been in the region much longer. In the late 
nineteenth century the former avoided the allotment of their lands but in the 
1950s had their government-to-government relationship with the federal gov-
ernment terminated, though that was reinstated in the 1970s. The Ho-Chunk 
were removed from the state, though they later returned, and now hold multiple 
parcels of non-contiguous land. The Ojibwe—now organized into six federally 
recognized bands with reservation land bases within the borders of the state— 
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and the Potawatomi began to settle into what would become Wisconsin from 
north of Lake Superior and east of Lake Michigan, respectively, in the mid-
seventeenth century, a consequence of the diaspora created by Iroquois expan-
sion (White 1991, 1-49). In turn, the Iroqouian Oneidas migrated from New 
York in the 1820s and 1830s, treating with both the Menominee and Ho-Chunk 
for rights to land. Stockbridge-Munsee and Brothertowns also migrated from 
the east at the same time. Most of these groups adopted Indian Reorganization 
Act constitutions in the 1930s, and all but the Oneida drew upon the authority of 
those constitutions to establish formal tribal courts10 in the federal Indian policy 
era of self-determination that began in 1970 and continues to the present. 
During the two-decade period (1954-1973) in which they experienced the 
disastrous effects of termination, the Menominee reservation became a county— 
admittedly Wisconsin's smallest and poorest, and the reservation was effec-
tively assimilated to the body of the state, for better, but mostly for worse. When 
they were restored to tribal status in 1973, the tribe re-instituted its Court of 
Indian Offenses for a six-year period, and then established a new court system 
in 1979 shortly after adopting a new constitution ordaining an independent ju-
diciary. Today the Menominee tribe has a vast bureaucracy administering a $55 
million year budget for the benefit of its 8,000 member-citizens. The forty-one 
tribal departments, which encompass more than 300 programs, are adminis-
tered by a team of three officers—two financial and one human resources 
officer—and report to a three-member management team, who in turn take 
direction from the chairman and the tribal legislature. The tribe employs 700 
people (Delabreau 2004) and another 500 to 1,000 in the casino. Additionally, 
tribal sawmills employ 250 to 500 (Advisors 2004). Because the reservation 
was transformed into a county for a period of twenty years, and therefore had 
the full jurisdictional responsibilities of any other state court, upon restoration 
to tribal status it retained that jurisdiction. The judicial system, which claims to 
be "a separate and equal branch of the tribal government" (Anonymous 1999), 
includes a Supreme Court and two lower courts and has assumed jurisdiction 
over the areas of criminal, civil, juvenile, probate, family, traffic, conservation, 
and small claims (Anonymous 2005). Since 1991, Menominee court orders and 
judgments are respected by the state of Wisconsin as it would those of any other 
court in the state system.11 
The Ho-Chunk Nation has eleven departments with an average often of-
fices, programs, or businesses within each.12 Because of the success of their 
casino complex in the tourist mecca of Wisconsin Dells, it can afford an annual 
per capita payment of $13,000 for each of its 6,000 tribal members, a yearly 
allocation of $77 million (Kozlowicz 2005). This is quite apart from other ex-
penditures, one of which is a $30 million annual payment to the state of Wis-
consin (Lewis 2004) that is currently being contested.13 The Nation employs 
about 3,600 people in the state of Wisconsin (Lewis 2005). 
The court system of the Ho-Chunk Nation, which is housed in a new, state-
of-the-art court building, includes a trial court, a supreme court, and a tradi-
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tional court, the latter comprised of the clan leaders who provide "guidance and 
assistance to the Judiciary" (Anonymous 1999). Unlike any other tribal court in 
the state, the Ho-Chunk Supreme Court has the power of judicial review. The 
trial court has assumed general civil jurisdiction in the area of child protection, 
collection of child support, elections, housing, employment, gaming, torts, con-
tracts, etc., and is taking personal jurisdiction over "[t]hose with tribal interac-
tions" (Anonymous 2005). Importantly, approximately 70 percent of the cases 
filed in this court are garnishments or civil cases14 where an agency is attempt-
ing to collect money owed by a tribal member. The Ho-Chunk Nation has pub-
lished all of its Supreme Court decisions since 1995 and all of its trial court 
decisions since 1997. The Court also has published a monthly bulletin on the 
judiciary's and other court's activities since 1998.15 
With just over 1,000 members, the Forest County Potawatomi tribe is the 
state's smallest. However, it is also the state's wealthiest tribe, the result prima-
rily of its $120 million-casino complex in Milwaukee. This gaming complex 
anchors an economy that includes a heavy equipment excavating and construc-
tion company, a logging cooperative, and other small businesses. The tribe has 
instituted and administers a number of educational, social service, and health 
programs for its members (Loew 2001, 98). In 1998, it established a court that 
hears cases in probate, truancy, child welfare, guardianships, small claims, name 
changes, paternity, employment, and housing (Anonymous 1999). 
The 1,500-member Mohican Nation/Stockbridge-Munsee Band, with a res-
ervation in two townships of Shawano County, has a government that is made 
up of more than forty offices and educational, social service, and health pro-
grams. Also operating a gaming facility, its casino employs 600 people, half of 
whom are non-Indian. The community has had a court since the mid-1990s, and 
it has adopted sixty-five chapters of tribal ordinances governing family law, 
hunting and fishing, public peace and order, juvenile law, adoptions, contracts, 
employment, probate and administrative appeals (Anonymous 2005). The court 
hears between 300 and 350 cases per year, the majority of which involve a tribal 
agency acting as plaintiff seeking money from a tribal member.16 
The Oneidas, whose land base is near Green Bay, have 13,000 citizen-
members and are the largest of Wisconsin's indigenous nations. The nation has 
six "divisions of operations" with about seventy-five programs or offices within 
those operations. It employs 3,500 people and has an annual budget of $150 
million. Unlike the other tribes in the state, Oneida uses an Appeals Commis-
sion constituted of eleven elected officials and "asserts original jurisdiction over 
contract law, limited environmental issues, garnishments, and probate matters" 
(Anonymous 1999), thus bringing most of its child welfare, domestic, and civil 
cases to Brown County court. 
The 15,000 Ojibwes are member-citizens of one of the six bands of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians located in the northernmost tier of counties in the 
state. Each band possesses a reservation that historically has had mixed econo-
mies that include timber industries, tourism, and subsistence hunting, fishing, 
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and gathering. All six began developing social service delivery systems through 
Office of Economic Opportunity programs in the 1960s that permitted tribes to 
bypass the Bureau of Indian Affairs and work directly with the federal agencies. 
Later tribal government functions expanded with the Indian Education and Self-
determination Act of 1975, which extended contracting opportunities between 
the tribes and the federal government. The Ojibwe bands further benefited from 
bingo in the 1980s, and later, casino gaming to different degrees, with most 
operating casino/hotel conference centers. 
With their increased economic and governmental powers, the state's Ojibwe 
bands have had a significant impact on the economies of surrounding non-In-
dian communities. The 700-member St. Croix Band is the largest employer in 
Burnett County. With a proposed $17.5 million 2006 budget (Wenzl 2005), the 
Lac du Flambeau Band is the largest employer in Vilas county. The Lac Courte 
Oreilles Band is the largest and the Bad River Band is the third largest employer 
in Sawyer County. Though the Sokoagon and Red Cliff Bands are located in 
sparsely populated areas of the state, with concomitant implications for the force 
of their economic and social presence,17 they join the other Ojibwe communi-
ties in having courts that assume general civil jurisdiction. 
Lac du Flambeau as an Exemplary Case 
The Lac du Flambeau Band—which is also referred to by its member-citi-
zens as the Lac du Flambeau Ojibwe Nation18—leads all the other bands of 
Ojibwe in the breadth of its courts' jurisdiction. In addition to child welfare, its 
legal code covers traffic, child support, paternity, housing, truancy, domestic 
abuse, juvenile drinking, landlord/tenant, conservation, natural resources on and 
off reservation, small claims, probate, and divorce. The tribe has begun to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction, though it is constrained because implementation of 
criminal justice is so expensive. It has a police force and keeps its tribal prison-
ers in the county jail. The band sells and retains the proceeds from tribal auto-
mobile, fishing, and All Terrain Vehicle licenses usable throughout the state. 
Because of the Supreme Court's 1978 Oliphant decision held that tribes do 
not have criminal jurisdiction over non-members, the prosecutor at Lac du Flam-
beau now offers non-member Indians stopped on the reservation by law 
enforcement authorities the option of accepting the tribe's jurisdiction or swearing 
in open court that they don't belong on the reservation. Tribal police do not ask 
for tribal IDs when they ticket and so presume jurisdiction, offering non-mem-
bers the option of transferring cases to county court at their initial appearance in 
tribal court. In sum, the tribe has adopted a self-conscious strategy of duplicat-
ing the procedures used by other sovereigns, presuming jurisdiction, thus acting 
in a sovereign state-like manner. 
As a result of these decisions and developments, the Lac du Flambeau 
Band—like other tribes in the state—are no longer best thought of as egalitar-
ian communities of people all descended from common ancestors, related by 
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blood and marriage and governed by custom and tradition. Managing health 
clinics and housing authorities, zoning and taxing, autonomously removing and 
placing children in private homes, certifying membership and marriages, exer-
cising extensive exclusive territorial and personal jurisdiction, sponsoring ex-
pressive cultural productions and placing monuments, and generally cultivating 
government-to-government relationships with federal and state governments, 
tribes now "wield a genuinely creative, quasi-divine power" (Bourdieu 1999, 
67) over their citizens.19 Not unlike other nation-states, tribes are becoming 
"dispersed ensemble(s) of institutional practices and techniques of governance" 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 14). These communities, to greater and lesser de-
grees depending on geographic location and proximity to markets for their suite 
of resources and services, are better thought of and certainly experienced by 
their members as "centralized, institutionalized, authoritative system(s) of po-
litical rule" (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992, 6), that is, as states. This is what 
sovereignty looks like on the ground. 
"It is now becoming clear that there are multiple roads to statehood," writes 
Ronald Cohen in 1979 in an introduction to Origins of the State: The Anthro-
pology of Political Evolution, though the book does not address thes 
transformations within American Indian tribes. Nonetheless, the world-wide 
revitalization of non-state, so-called "tribal" or "peripheral peoples" (Niezen 
2003), is manifested in the United States as a sovereignty movement that asserts 
the legal status of the tribes as self-governing "domestic dependent nations" 
that are simultaneously subject to the plenary power of Congress. It should be 
recalled that in one of its very first treaties, before it drafted its present constitu-
tion, the United States encouraged the Delaware in a 1778 treaty "to invite any 
other tribes who have been friends to the interest of the United States, to join the 
present confederation, and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be 
the head" (Kappler 1972,5). So the notion that tribes might become states actu-
ally has a long history. 
Local Roots of Tribal Statehood 
An argument can be made that these developments in the direction of greater 
local sovereignty can be accounted for entirely by appealing to exogenous causes. 
Beginning in the 1970s, a flurry of federal legislation supportive of Indian sov-
ereignty and a few Supreme Court decisions, all taking place in a global context 
of the revitalization of so-called peripheral and indigenous peoples, might give 
the impression that the changes that have taken place among the tribes of Wis-
consin are best understood as outcomes of actions taken in Washington D.C. 
Because home-grown change will not only challenge this presumption, but also 
because it implicates some fundamental problems of legal pluralism that emerge 
when reservation communities tacitly embrace the idea that the state is the real-
ization of the nation—first articulated by Leopold Senghor, first president of 
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Senegal—I now want to discuss one of the historical strands that has produced 
this renaissance and its implications for tribal statehood. 
In Wisconsin, these self-determinative and regulatory projects and devel-
opments were given impetus by the Voigt decision, the watershed federal ap-
peals court decision in 1983 that nullified the state's jurisdiction over Ojibwe 
Indian hunting and fishing on the lands—the entire northern third of the state— 
ceded to the federal government in the treaties of 1837 and 1842 (Nesper 2002). 
The major issue in Voigt was whether the state of Wisconsin could extend its 
jurisdiction to regulate the off-reservation hunting, fishing and gathering rights 
explicitly guaranteed to the Ojibwe in the those treaties. And though the state 
had been exercising these powers for over a century, much to everyone's shock, 
the court found that the state did not have this power. 
The Voigt decision first refigured the relationships among the bands of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians because the reserved treaty rights were a property 
right that was shared by the bands collectively, thus requiring an unprecedented 
administrative engagement with each other. Then it refigured the relationships 
between those bands and the other tribes in the state, because it foregrounded 
differences between tribes that did and did not have such rights. Finally, it changed 
relations between all of the tribes and the state as the decision and its conse-
quences laid the groundwork for the negotiations that were soon to take place 
over gaming.20 It also motivated the development of tribal conservation law and 
catalyzed the emergence of tribal courts on Ojibwe reservations that did not 
already have them.21 Motivated by both the desire to fully implement the Indian 
Child Welfare Act and to administer tribal off-reservation natural resource law, 
the court soon assumed jurisdiction in other areas noted earlier. 
Mark Galanter has argued that courts confer endowments as their most 
important "radiating effect" (Galanter 1981, 1983), on both the member-citi-
zens as well as the institutions that constitute the communities within which 
they operate. With a court, the tribe now possessed an instrumentality for real-
izing policy decisions in the daily lives of reservation community members. 
The institutional developments that should cause us to re-imagine reservation 
communities as emergent states, then, are importantly tied up in the develop-
ment of courts of law. 
Among the Ojibwe themselves, there is considerable ambivalence about 
this emergent transformation of reservation societies to tribal states, and I con-
tend that the courts represent an arena in which these ambivalences become 
visible. This occurs not only because courts are inherently sites of contestation, 
but because all tribal courts have the problem that Pommersheim (1995) refers 
to as contextual legitimacy: to what extent should local traditions and culture 
inform the organization and procedures of courts and how should these issues 
be debated and decided? 
As noted earlier, the federal government gave its share of civil and criminal 
jurisdiction to the state in 1953 in Public Law 280, which was an aspect of the 
termination legislation. This meant that for much of the second half of the twen-
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tieth century, Indian people have had to leave their reservations and go into 
what they perceive to be hostile territory in an effort to receive justice, an out-
come that most will say they never achieved because they tended to go as defen-
dants rather than as plaintiffs. Thus many Indian people are suspicious of the 
local non-Indian courts. 
Not only have Ojibwe people tended to lose in court, but because of the 
cultural differences that separate them from the broader society, they tend to be 
suspicious of the kinds of social relations that organize the very process of court. 
Former chief judge at Lac du Flambeau, the Honorable Ernest St. Germaine, 
has told me that Anishinaabe people fear courts and are generally averse to both 
receiving and making judgments.22 The consequence of this perception of courts 
as alien and imported institutions, with the potential to restructure customary 
social relations within the community, is that they are encountered with consid-
erable trepidation and ambivalence. 
As a result of this ambivalence, in order to establish and reinforce their 
legitimacy, tribal courts repeatedly and routinely function with several audi-
ences in mind. On the one hand, courts need to recognize, consider, and even 
embrace the traditional local community values to which Judge St. Germaine 
alluded, so that they will be credible in the sectors of the reservation that are 
most responsible for the maintenance of the entire community's distinct histori-
cal and cultural identity. Courts must then incorporate some elements of tradi-
tion, though tradition itself is a contested domain. On the other hand, in order to 
have its judgments given full faith and credit by the state of Wisconsin, so that 
its orders are enforced beyond the borders of the reservation—a value that is 
often also important to the tribal member-citizens who use the court as plain-
tiffs—the tribal court must look a lot like a state court and not appear to be too 
Indian. 
This is the local version of a general dilemma that has been identified and 
articulated by the likes of Henry Sumner Maine (2002), Morton Fried (1967) 
and Stanley Diamond (1974) all of whom, in different ways, distinguish be-
tween social relations organized by custom and social relations organized by 
law and the implications of that difference for social order. Diamond summa-
rizes the issue succinctly: the appearance of laws (and presumably a court to 
administer them) "... represent a new set of social goals pursued by a new and 
unanticipated power in society" (Diamond 1974,265). For reservation commu-
nities, this "unanticipated power" is the tribe. The tribes are political entities 
originally consolidated in relationships with the federal government (Cornell 
1988; Goldberg-Ambrose 1994) or, as John Collier, the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs who was instrumental in the creation of many tribal constitutions, 
characterized them, as the "instrumentalities of the Federal Government" (quoted 
in Washburn 1984,286). 
The challenge of reconciling the law/custom dichotomy was noted by legal 
and political scholars Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford Lytle at the same time that 
the court at Lac du Flambeau emerged: 
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The greatest challenge faced by the modern tribal court sys-
tem is in the harmonizing of past Indian customs and tradi-
tions with the dictates of contemporary jurisprudence. Tribes 
are reluctant to abandon their past traditions by placing too 
much reliance on the whites' legal procedures and practices. 
While borrowing some Anglo-American notions about the 
system of justice, tribal courts are struggling to preserve much 
of the wisdom of their past experiences (1983, 120). 
More recently, Russell Lawrence Barsh (1999) concluded that in their efforts to 
be respected by the larger society, tribal courts at times have resolved this ten-
sion by compromising their credibility in their own communities by failing to 
develop a distinctive jurisprudence reflective of community values and concep-
tions of justice. I argue that it is unlikely that the tension will soon be resolved 
but, given the persistence and revitalization of tribal cultural traditions within 
the context of a broader society with marked differences, it will be a permanent, 
on-going condition. 
The push and pull of these contradictory forces and expectations is shaping 
a distinctive Indian jurisprudence none-the-less because, even as they evolve, 
Indian communities are all in the same formal or structural situation. The inter-
nal desire and external pressures to remain culturally distinct—a requirement 
for participating in American society as "natives," (Dombrowski 2001,11-12)— 
conflicts with the largely external expectation that justice systems be recogniz-
able or "legible" (Scott 1998) to larger and more powerful sovereigns in many 
of the cases that are brought to trial in tribal court. At Lac du Flambeau, this 
conflict is most readily apparent in off-reservation hunting and fishing cases.23 
Hunting and Fishing Trials in 
Tribal Court at Lac du Flambeau 
The Lac du Flambeau Band created a court in response to the Voigt deci-
sion though it had been moving in this direction since the passage of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act gave the tribes exclusive jurisdiction over tribal children in 
1978. The fact that it was a federal court decision over off-reservation hunting, 
fishing, and gathering and not an act of the federal legislature that catalyzed the 
emergence of the court is a measure of the importance of hunting and fishing to 
this community. I have extensively rehearsed the history and depth of commit-
ment to those activities and the way of life they entail elsewhere (Nesper 2002, 
2006). Suffice to briefly repeat here that the very name of the reservation, trans-
latable as "Torch Lake," refers to hunting and fishing at night; cars were effec-
tively assimilated as terrestrial canoes in the early twentieth century, useful for 
hunting the logging roads. Thus, when this single band of 2,500 people were 
offered the equivalent of $5 million a year for ten years in 1989 by the state of 
Wisconsin to forebear spearing a few thousand fish during a two-week period in 
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the spring, they turned it down, tacitly proclaiming that each fourteen-inch fish 
was worth more than $700 to them, a rather emphatic and dramatic statement of 
the practice's local value. 
Prior to the state's failure to lease these rights from the tribes in 1989, and 
while the tribes and the state were involved in federal court litigation over the 
scope of the rights and the permissible bounds of state regulations, these sover-
eigns sat down with each other and negotiated forty interim agreements regard-
ing hunting, fishing, and gathering, out of which emerged a body of codified 
tribal off-reservation conservation law. When it came time to adjudicate dis-
putes that arose over alleged violations of this tribal conservation code, it was 
clear that a plural legal order had come to exist. One was that body of custom-
ary practices that organized the harvests in a context of state domination. The 
other was the force of newly codified tribal law. Once called "violating," that is, 
exercising one's stipulated treaty rights in the absence of state recognition, the 
mores that governed the use of off-reservation resources had been matters of 
custom. Now they were matters of law. 
Resistance to the new order of tribal law and tribal courts came from mem-
bers of the sector of Ojibwe society who were occasionally referred to by court 
personnel as "subsistence hunters," "fishing families," or "treaty hunters"— 
often with unpredictable results. Because the tribal court had adopted the stan-
dard rules of civil procedure current in the state system, defendants in hunting 
and fishing cases were unfamiliar with what they perceived to be strict rules for 
speaking in tribal court. Ostensibly informal, defendants can appear without an 
attorney, but, given the great disadvantage this represents, the tribes have un-
dertaken efforts to develop a cadre of lay advocates, minimally trained in law to 
the point of some parity with their law-school trained and often non-Indian tribal 
prosecutor opponents. The initiative supplied a few score tribal member-citi-
zens with skills that qualified them for more lucrative careers in the tribal bu-
reaucracy, into which nearly all migrated. 
Defendants also passively resisted the authority of the court and the emerg-
ing tribal state in the ways described by James Scott in Weapons of the Weak 
(1985) by not showing up at court; by not bringing an advocate after asking for 
a continuance in order to procure one; by failing to pay fines; but most of all by 
pleading not guilty and offering defenses that drew upon the values of the reser-
vation society imagined in its custom-governed communitarian mode, thus im-
plicitly contesting the apparatus of the state in which they had to make their 
arguments. I offer a summary of cases that will be more extensively discussed in 
another venue24 and present one in greater detail. 
Nocturnal road hunting for deer off the reservation had become traditional 
over the course of the twentieth century as automobiles became more afford-
able. The methods and size of harvests were subject to the customary regulation 
exercised by families. Since the Voigt decision, however, tribal law now regu-
lates hunting off the reservation as well as spearing spawning fish25 at night in 
the spring. Cited for using an artificial light, or having a loaded and uncased 
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rifle in one's vehicle, or shooting from less than fifty feet from the center line of 
a paved road—the most common of the deer hunting violations—or spearing 
too many fish of a certain size, those cited for such violations and their lay 
advocates explicitly and implicitly allege racism on the parts of both state26 and 
tribal wardens who write those citations. In doing so they remind the 
professionalizing, salaried, tribal court personnel and law enforcement sector 
of the community of the long history of race relations between the reservation 
and "the surrounding community," as it is called, and evoke a conception of 
reservation society as an egalitarian kinship-based "family of families" as it has 
been credibly imagined for generations. Defendants have brought expert wit-
nesses into such trials—often elders—who rehearse the history of hunting and 
fishing. The very presence of these icons of historical and cultural continuity 
can cause the court to lose confidence in the adversarial model of truth-finding 
it has adopted and set its alien speaking conventions aside.27 
As another measure of the strength of the customs and values that still 
undergird many of the hunting practices in this community, few cases of wast-
ing natural resources are prosecuted, despite allegations made by neighboring 
non-Indians that these "treaty hunters" and members of "fishing families"28 had 
exceeded legal limits: they will point to deer gut piles and the voluminous piles 
of scrap left from filleting fish, the preferred method of butchering in this com-
munity. In one of the rare cases, the defendant had left a deer hanging in his 
friend's mother's yard intending that his non-resident friend retrieve it on an 
expected visit to the reservation from the city in which he resided. The prospec-
tive recipient never made the trip. The carcass rotted, gained the attention of a 
tribal warden, and resulted in a citation to the defendant who had tagged the 
deer.29 Not contesting the facts, the defendant testified that he had apologized to 
the "Great Spirit"—(had he used the Ojibwemowin Gizhay Manitou, it might 
have given him more credibility to his claim)—then pantomimed the momen-
tary private apology he offered. The judge, educated in "the traditional law of 
our people," interrogated him closely on his understanding of these rather eso-
teric matters of spiritual repair and discerned an egregious ignorance on the part 
of the defendant, which was best remedied with a charge that he seek the advice 
of an elder and pay a $150 fine, which was a steep one at the time. 
Several cases had to address whether or not the alleged hunting violation 
took place on or off the reservation because the tribe regulates hunting and 
fishing far less strictly on the reservation, where custom still obtains.30 In offer-
ing opportunities for the recitation of oral histories of the community's view of 
federal policy and the meaning of the legally guaranteed physical separation 
tribes suffer and enjoy, such cases also set in motion discourses about what 
constitutes local Indian identity, especially since custom still governs in some 
domains within the borders of the reservation. 
Physical borders are not the only kinds of borders that generate extensive 
discussions in court about just what kind of community this community is going 
Tribal Wisconsin's Indigenous Judicial Systems 245 
to be, to paraphrase Clifford Geertz's characterization of what, in the end, is 
always being debated inside of courtrooms (1983, 230). Issues about social 
borders and the authority to constitute and patrol them have also emerged. Un-
der formal tribal laws, tribal members may not be assisted in their off-reserva-
tion hunting, fishing, and gathering by non-tribal members. As a result, men 
have been cited for fishing with their sons and their common-law brothers-in-
law. Here a social order organized by the complexities, irregularities, flexibilities, 
and improvisations of custom and the vicissitudes of history conflicts with the 
simplicity of abstract law. 
The tribe, via the Tribal Code in this area of the law, establishes the param-
eters for a division of labor within a potentially, and even likely, heterogeneous 
social group centered on tribal members' harvesting rights. But such constraints 
are a violation of customary practices. The provision of the tribal legal code 
that prevents all but spouses and children from assisting in the exercise of the 
rights orchestrates the code's valorizing both marriage31 and nuclear families, 
both concepts imported from the dominant society and generally on the ascen-
dancy for at least the last century. In trials contesting such concepts, the defense 
has invoked the rules about the rules, as it were, quoting provisions of the Tribal 
Code that permit tribal courts to apply "any custom of the Chippewa Tribe not 
prohibited by the laws of the United States," arguing for the customary right of 
tribal members to have relationships of production with whomever they choose 
to associate, and thus constitute their families in traditional ways. Defendants 
have presented those customs and contend that "the sharing process" is "one of 
the customary things that Indian people have done in the past, and will continue 
to do, and will continue to get them in trouble," emphasizing in their very dis-
course characteristics that they maintain distinguish Indian and non-Indian 
people: Indians are invariably generous, while non-Indians are greedy. 
In a trial that found the defendant guilty of receiving assistance from a 
non-tribal member, the judge elicited from the defendant the assertion that "I 
consider him as a family member, as an Ojibwe person." The judge then went 
on to address what he called "the long-range ramifications" in giving his deci-
sion. "If I said 'OK, Hank [the non-tribal member] is member of your family,' 
then I'm saying he's a member of mine too." Here the judge was evoking the 
very conception of community and traditional means of constituting it that the 
tribal state is slowly displacing even as he was facilitating the process of that 
transformation. 
Conclusions 
These hunting and fishing trials reveal the tension within this reservation 
society between the community and the tribe. Those same tensions may appear 
in Ho-Chunk tribal court in the trials over the oft-contested elections, or at 
Stockbridge-Munsee in their many civil cases, having to do with "money owed," 
in the stark terms offered by its clerk of courts,32 or in any number of other 
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jurisdictional domains these tribal courts are taking on. While endowing tribal 
members with certain rights—two score or more Flambeau women seek re-
straining orders on their violent mates every year, far more seek court-ordered 
child support from the fathers of their children—most of the endowments that 
the courts have conferred have benefited tribal members acting in the capacity 
of agents of the tribal state. Child welfare department personnel appear in court 
seeking orders to remove and place tribal children, housing personnel come 
seeking judgments on delinquent rent, and managers of tribal businesses sue 
tribal members for other monetary claims. And among the Ojibwe, as I have 
shown, the tribes as arbiters of the proper use of the off-reservation wildlife are 
often plaintiffs in cases against tribal member-citizens. 
There is ambivalence about this social evolution that would set aside the 
norms that govern individual morality in a society understood to be organized 
by "diffuse enduring solidarity," or generalized reciprocity, which obtains be-
tween those who see themselves as related "by blood"—or, at least, descended 
from the same ancestors, and the morality that obtains in a society imagined as 
an organization of citizens each in a fundamental way the same as every other 
whose affection for each other is more abstract, calculated, and restricted. At 
the same time, as sovereign communities, it is necessary and mostly desirable 
for reservation communities to evolve into tribal states. It is also necessary and 
desirable for them to maintain the cultural distinctiveness that is rooted in their 
historic forms of socio-political organization. The course has been set, and it 
requires steering between the tribes fully assimilating as annexes of the states 
within which they live, and the neo-traditionalist rejection of all imported insti-
tutions. The communities have shown that they have resilience, patience, and 
leadership to navigate these dangers, but the waters are not smooth and the 
outcomes are not certain. They are most worthy of our attention. 
Notes 
Research for this article has been supported by an ACLS/Mellon Fellowship, as well 
as the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Ball State Uni-
versity. 
1. Along with Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oregon, the state of Wisconsin 
was given the federal government's share of tribal-federal concurrent civil and criminal jurisdiction 
over Indians in 1953 in what is widely referred to as Public Law 280. The legislation was an 
aspect of the federal policy of termination. 
2. Two U.S. Supreme Court cases in the 1980s—National Farmers Union Insurance 
Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians (468 US 1315) in 1984 and Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante (480 
US 9) in 1987—affirmed the sovereignty of the tribes, holding that "tribal courts are the primary 
forums for adjudicating civil disputes on the reservations" (Pommersheim 1995, 57). 
3. See Tebben (2001). 
4. A well-placed, long-tenured state employee who shall remain anonymous has informed 
me that in discussions of state policy a bi-polar presumption—that is, state-local (the latter referring 
to towns, villages, county boards) opposition has given way to a tri-polar model—"state-local-
tribal"—in recent years. Executive Order #39, "Relating to an Affirmation of the Government-
to-Government Relationship Between the State of Wisconsin and Indian Tribal Governments 
Located Within the State of Wisconsin," signed by Governor Jim Doyle on June 28, 2005 
authorizes this sea change. 
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5. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978). 
6. Although there are numerous laws vesting criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 
the most important and general are Indian Country Crimes Act, originating in 1790 and amended 
several times since, which extended federal enclave law to interracial crimes in Indian country. 
The Major Crimes Act (1885) established jurisdiction over 13 felonies, and the Assimilative 
Crimes Act (1948) allowed federal prosecution for state law violations (Getches 1993, 553). 
7. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 US 515 (1832). 
8. There is a means to cite from decisions made in other tribal courts as The Indian Law 
Reporter is published monthly and collects cases from tribal courts throughout the country. 
9. Gregg Guthrie used this expression in an interview that took place on July 5, 1999 at 
his home in Lac du Flambeau while I was doing historical research on the community's museum. 
10. The Oneidas had a court in the 1860s (Hauptman 1993) and the Menominees had a 
Court of Indian Offenses from the late nineteenth century (Keesing 1987, 176) until they were 
terminated in 1954. Lac du Flambeau had a "law and order ordinance" and a court between 1948 
and 1953 (LdF Tribal Code, Chapter 70, History Note). 
11. This is to say that the "full faith and credit" the federal constitution requires the states 
to extend to each other's public acts, records, and judicial proceedings (Gifis 1996, 215) are also 
extended to the tribes with which the state has such a relationship. 
12. See the Organizational Chart: Executive Branch of the Ho-Chunk Nation at http:// 
www.ho-chunknation.com/government/executive/org_chart.htm. 
13. The currently unresolved Dairy land Greyhound Park, Inc. v. James P Doyle (03-0421) 
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court has cast a shadow over the legality of both tribal-state compacts 
and casino gaming in the state, with the plaintiff holding that a 1993 amendment to the state 
constitution prohibits casino gaming. 
14. Telephone interview with Marcella Cloud, Clerk of Courts Ho-Chunk Nation, August 
15, 2005. 
15. See Judicial Branch of the Ho-Chunk Nation at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/ 
government/courts.htm. 
16. Telephone interview with Wayne Malone, Sr., Clerk of Courts Stockbridge-Munsee, 
August 15, 2005. 
17. Patty Loew (2001, 99) notes that in recognition of the gaming market disparity, the 
Potawatomis share their profits with the Red Cliff Band, a kind of foreign aid program. 
18. Like other sovereigns, the tribe has a flag that hangs in the tribal council room, where 
tribal laws are made, and in the court, where they are enforced. 
19. Tribal "citizenship" is beginning to replace "membership" in both professional literature 
about and elite discourse within Indian country. The "quasi-divine power" of which Bourdieu 
(1999, 67) speaks, refers to the state's ability to "state what a being is in truth . . . what he or she 
is authorized to be, what he has a right to be." The extent to which tribes wield this power can 
be assessed by reading letters written by disaffected tribal member-citizens to the editors of 
newspapers published in the non-Indian towns near the reservations complaining about the power 
of tribal governments. The newspapers operated by the tribes, though an important means of 
imagining the nation (see Anderson 1983), tend to be uncritical of the tribal governments. 
20. It was the Lac du Flambeau and Mole Lake Bands that sued the governor in federal 
court over provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act twice while the treaty rights litigation 
was proceeding. 
21. Red Cliff had established a court in 1978 to adjudicate disputes arising out of State of 
Wisconsin v. Gurnoe (53 Wis. 2d 390) that affirmed treaty-fishing rights in Lake Superior 
(Anonymous 1999) The Lac Courte Oreilles Band established a court at the same time as a 
response to the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
22. Telephone interview with Ernest St. Germaine, March 23, 2005. 
23. Because it is most accessible. In principle, trials contesting domestic abuse, divorce, 
and child welfare hearings would be as revealing of the ways in which custom and law are 
negotiated but the first two are rare and Indian Child Welfare proceedings in this court are not 
open to parties without a direct interest in the case, a policy that I was not willing to contest for 
the sake of this study. Instead, I was permitted to make copies of the audio-taped records of 
natural resource trials that took place between 1983 and 2000 which form the basis of this research. 
24. "Tribal courts and tribal states in the era of self-determination: Ojibwe in Wisconsin," 
will appear in the Beyond Red Power: New Perspectives on Twentieth-Century American Indian 
Politics, Daniel M. Cobb and Loretta Fowler, eds. Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press. Forthcoming. 
25. Ojibwes spear walleyed pike and muskellunge, a practice prohibited by Wisconsin of 
all its other citizens, though there is a short sturgeon-spearing season on Lake Winnebago in the 
east-central part of the state. 
26. Recognizing that they did not possess the law enforcement capacity to police the entire 
northern third of the state of Wisconsin, the tribes collectively credentialized state game wardens 
to enforce tribal law, the state accepting the burden in the interest of conservation. 
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27. The deference to elders in court has included not swearing them in, and reportedly 
inviting them to speak Ojibwemowin if they would prefer. 
28. The non-Indians who make such allegations do not use these terms. They often use 
pejorative terms when discussing such matters. 
29. In the negotiations the tribes agreed to adopt many of the state's deer hunting management 
practices. 
30. The Tribe has separate code for use of resources on the reservation but does not regulate 
deer hunting on the reservation at all. 
31. The tribal code adopted in 1948 recognized all extant "Indian marriages," as they were 
called, but it also sought to end the practice by refusing to recognize such subsequent unions. 
32. Telephone interview with Wayne Malone, Sr., Clerk of Courts Stockbridge-Munsee, 
August 15, 2005. 
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